In this paper, we present methods to compute Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices for weighted majority games when some players are incompatible. We use the so-called generating functions as a tool.
1 Introduction en importnt fmily of the soElled oopertive gmes with trnsferle utility is the formed y simple gmesD whih hve numerous pplitionsD espeilly in the eld of politil sieneF snsted of speking of vlue s in generl oopertive gmesD when working with simple gmesD we usully use the term power index euse simple gmes re normlly used s model of orgnisms in whih deisions re determined y voting greementsF he interest of these gmes usully fous on knowing the power or inuene plyer hs on the nl outomeF he wellEknown hpley vlue @hpE leyD IWSQA nd fnzhf vlue @fnzhfD IWTSA re lled in the ontext of simple gmes hpleyEhuik power index @hpley nd huikD IWSRA nd fnzhfEgolemn power index @fnzhfD IWTSD nd golemnD IWUIAD I respetivelyF por the interested rederD there re some pplitions nd speE i studies out simple gmes in sshikw @PHHWA nd uojim nd snohr @PHIHAD mong othersF hpleyEhuik nd fnzhfEgolemn power indies n e otined using dierent toolsF wo of the most ommonly used re the multiliner extension nd the generting funtionF he ltterD minly used in the se of soElled weighted mjority gmesD re sed on the use of omintoril nlysis tehniqueF oughly spekingD generting funtion is polynomil tht llows listing ll the possile olitionsD trked y their respetive weightsF his is very useful euse we n get the ext vlue of the indies even in gmes with mny plyersF his tehnique ws used y hvid qF gntor @IWTPA @it ppers in vusD IWVQA to lulte the hpleyEhuik power index nd y frms nd efuso @IWUTA for the fnzhfEgolemn power indexF filo et lF @PHHHA ompute nd pply the hpleyEhuik nd the fnzhfEgolemn power indies for weighted mjority gmes nd study the time omplexity of the orresponding lgorithmsF elonsoEweijide et lF @PHIPA propose methods sed in generting funtions to ompute the heegnEkel @heegn nd kelD IWUWAD the uli qood @rollerD IWVPAD nd the hift @elonsoEweijide nd preixsD PHIHA power indiesF ghess @PHIRA provides new method lso sed in generting funtions to ompute the uli qood power indexF sn the lssil theory of oopertive gmesD it is ssumed tht ll plyers n ommunite freelyF sn other situtionsD the plyers t nonEoopertivelyD ut intermedite situtions re lso possileD where ommunition is reE stritedF wyerson @IWUUAD ywen @IWVTAD nd pern ndez et lF @PHHPA use grphs to model nd study situtions in whih there re nities etween plyersF sn this pperD we onsider situtions where some plyers re inomptE ileD tht isD some plyers nnot ooperte mong them y ideologil or eonomil resonsF he inomptiilities mong plyers re modelled y grph in suh wy tht if two plyers re linked y n r of the grphD these two plyers re inomptileF hese situtions re studied in grE rers @IWWIAD grrers nd ywen @IWWTAD ku @PHHVAD fergntiños et lF @IWWQAD nd elonsoEweijide et lF @PHHWAD mong othersF sn the lst two ppersD moditions of the hpley nd fnzhf vluesD respetivelyD for these situtions re dened nd hrterizedF et this stgeD in the se of weighted mjority gmesD we fe the tsk of otining the hpleyEhuik nd fnzhfEgolemn power indies when some plyers re inomptileD using generting funtionsF fesidesD we study the omplexity of the proE posed methodsF he rst prt of oth lgorithms requires to nd the mxE iml lique of grph @fF ekkoyunluD IWUQD fron nd ueroshD IWUQD houglsD PHHID nd fhls et lFD PHIQAF pinllyD we pply oth power indies to n exmple tken from the rel worldF P e gme @N; W A P SI@NA is sid to e weighted mjority gme if there exists set of weights w 1 ; : : : ; w n for the plyersD with w i P N fHgD I i nD nd quot q P N @q > HA suh tht S P W if nd only if w@SA a iPS w i ! qF he mount q is lled mjority of the gmeF ypillyD weighted mjority gme is represented y qY w 1 ; : : : ; w n : e prliment n e seen s weighted mjority gmeD in whih the plyers re the politil prtiesD the weights re the numer of sets ville to eh prtyD nd the mjority of the gme oinides with the minimum numer of votes needed to win votingF sf the riterion is the most simpleD then q a E@tA C ID where t is the hlf of the totl numer of sets in the prliment 1 F sn generlD q ! E@tA C I nd this implies tht the resulting simple gme is lwys properF yther exmples of weighted mjority gmes re the eurity gounil of the nited xtions or the gounil of the iuropen nionF his seriesD f a @tA; is lled the generting funtion of the sequene aD nd my e nite or inniteF xote tht in this seriesD the vrile t hs no proper mening nd it only serves to identify a j s the oeient orresponding to vet N a fI; : : : ; ng e nite setF en undireted grph without loops on N is set of unordered pirsD denoted @i X jAD of dierent elementsF hese pirs re lled rsF @xote tht @i X jA a @j X iAAF e denote y g N the omplete grph on N nd y GR @NA the set of undireted grphs on ND tht isX g N a f@i X jA j i P N; j P N; i T a jg nd GR@NA a fg j g g N g: vet us tke g P GR @NAF qiven pir of plyers i; j P ND i nd j re inomptile if @i X jA P gF wo plyers i nd j re inomptile if they nnot ooperte t ll etween themF e olition S is suset of omptile plyers if nd only if @i X jA = P g for ll i; j P S: he se g a Y; represents the sitution in whih no inomptile plyers existF e denote y g the fmily of ll mximl susets of omptile plyersF por eh i P ND we dene the set of plyer i9s omptile plyersD C@iAD s followsX C@iA a fj P N j @i X jA T P gg: por ny olition S ND we denote y P @S; gA the set of ll prtitions of S whose lsses re susets of omptile plyersF Proposition 4 If g P GR@NA is a graph of incompatibilities, the family of all maximal sets of compatible players, g, is given by S P g if nd only if jPS C@jA a S:
Proof. vet S P g eD then we hve tht i P S D i P C@jA; for ll j P S D i P jPS C@jA nd the result followsF £ e sitution with inomptiilities is triplet @N; v; gA where @N; vA is gme nd g P GR @NAF sn fergntiños et lF @IWWQAD rule is introduedD whih selets pyo for every possile sitution with inomptiilitiesD nd they prove tht it is uniquely determinedF hey dene the gErestrition of gme in sitution with inomptiilities s followsF A a fS P M@W Aj @i X jA T P g; for ll i; j P Sg.
ProofF pirstD ssume tht for every S P M@W A there re i S ; j S P S suh tht @i S X j S A P gF ke R NF henD for every P P P @R; gA nd T P P there is no S P M@W A suh tht S T F henD v@T A a H nd v g @RA a HF eondD ssume tht the set A a fS P M@W Aj @i X jA T P g; V i; j P Sg is nonemptyF st is ler tht for every S P AD we hve v g @SA a IF ke R NF ine the simple gme @N; vA is properD for every S 1 ; S 2 P AD S 1 S 2 T a Y holdsF husD for every P P P @R; gA there is t most olition T P P with v@T as it follows from Proposition 6. Notice that this game is not a weigthed majority game. For any system of weights, we must have w 1 > w 3 because coalition fI; R; Sg is winning but coalition fQ; R; Sg is losing. Then, coalition fI; P; Sg should be also winning, but this is not the case. Example 8 Take the weigthed majority game @N; W A given in Example 7. Consider the graphg a f@I X PA; @Q X RA; @I X QA; @I X RA; @P X RA; @Q X SAg as the one which describes the incompatibilities among the players in N. Since the set of minimal winning coalitions in @M; W A is given by M@W A a ffI; Pg; fI; Qg; fI; R; Sg; fP; Q; Rg; fP; Q; Sgg;
if we take into account the graph of incompatibilitiesg, theg-restriction game is the null game.
es we n see in ixmple UD the g restrition of weighted mjority gme @N; W AD despite eing simple gmeD n not e weighted mjority gmeF sn suh sitution we n not pply the proedure of generting funE tions diretly in order to ompute its hpleyEhuik nd fnzhfEgolemn power indiesF e therefore propose new methodD lso sed on generting funtionsD whih solves this diultyF sn wht followsD we ssume tht if @N; v; gA is sitution with inomptE iilities then the gErestrition gme @N; v g A is simple gmeF 4 Generating functions and situations with incompatibilities sn this setionD we onsider weighted mjority gmes with inomptiiliE ties nd we use generting funtions to ompute the fnzhfEgolemn nd hpleyEhuik indiesF e lso provide some results onerning the omE plexity nd n illustrtive numeril exmpleF iA ke i P N nd S N n i suh tht S T P W g F his implies tht w@S C j A q ID for every j P KF sf S is swing for plyer iD we hve S i P W g F henD there is l P K i with w@@S iA C l A ! qF henD q w i w@S C l A q IF ke l P K i with l a minfr P K i j q w i w@S C r A q IgF husD w@S C m A q w i ID for every m P K i @lAF henD the result diretly followsF iiA gonsider the funtion IF e lower ound of c is otined in the se in whih the weights of ll plyers re equl nd there re no inomptiilitiesD tht is w 1 a : : : a w n nd g a YF sn this seD we hve to onsider the numer of terms of @I C t w j A n D tht isD n C IF yn the other hndD we hve thtX @w@C l A C IAF woreoverD t worstD in se ll exponents of the terms of BC@t 1 ; : : : ; t k A re dierentD the numer c oinides with the numer of susets of ND P n F PF st is strightforwrd y prt IF £ he time omplexity funtion f X N 3 N of n lgorithm give us the mximum time f@nA needed to solve ny prolem instne of enoding length t most n P NF e funtion f@nA is O@g@nAA if there is onstnt k suh tht jf@nAj kjg@nAj for ll integers n P NF e nlyze our lgorithms in the rithmeti modelD tht isD we ount elementry rithmeti opertions nd ssignmentsF por instneD the lgorithm for omputing the produt of two n ¢ n mtries is O@n 3 AF e left the proofs to the redersF Proposition 11 Take the weigthed majority game given by qY w 1 ; : : : ; w n . 
IP
Remark 15 In Proposition 9 and Proposition 12, we need g, the family of maximal subsets of compatible players related with the weighted majority game with incompatibilities @N; W; gA. That involves to nding the maximal cliques of the so-called dual graph of the graph g. In the literature, there are ecient algorithms to do this (cf. Akkoyunlu, 1973 , Bron and Kerbosch, 1973 , and Tomita et al., 2011 .
4.3
The numerical example
Example 16 Take again the weigthed majority game @N; W A and the graph g analyzed in Example 7. We will use the results of Proposition 9 and Proposition 12 to obtain the Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices of the situation with incompatibilities @N; W; gA.
In Table 1 we show, for each player, his set of compatible players.
lyer C@iA I fI; Q; R; Sg P fP; Q; R; Sg Q fI; P; Q; Sg R fI; P; R; Sg S fI; P; Q; R; Sg le IX gomptile plyersF
The family of maximal subsets of compatible players is given by g a ffI; Q; Sg; fI; R; Sg; fP; Q; Sg; fP; R; Sgg:
We take player 5 to illustrate the computation of the number of swings.
Once we associate the variable t r to the coalition C r P g, for every r a I; : : : ; R, we compute the function BC 5 @t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ; t 4 A: 
